McDowell's Trilemma Argument - Part 14

I have finished looking at some simple ways of reconstructing McDowell's reasonsing concerning Jesus' claim to forgive sins. The last reconstruction we examined went as follows:

2b. Jesus claimed that he could forgive sins.
3a. Jesus believed that only God could forgive sins.
Therefore,
4b. Jesus claimed to be God.

A counterexample showed not only that this argument was deductively invalid, but also that it falls short of providing a good reason for its conclusion:

(CE2) Jesus made it plain to other people around him that he did not believe that only God could forgive sins.

A counterexample to the validity of a deductive argument can be completely imaginary, unrealistic, and far-fetched. So long as the counterexample is logically possible, the deductive argument is proven to be invalid. But this counterexample is more than a mere logical possibility; it is at least somewhat probable (it has at least one chance in ten of being true).

Furthermore, (CE2) points to a whole category of circumstances under which the inference would fail. In short, (CE2) points to a necessary condition for the application of the concept of "claiming to be X". More specifically, since the argument here is not that Jesus is directly and explicitly claiming to be God, the relevant concept at work is "making an implied claim to be X." But making an implied claim requires that Jesus publically advocate or accept other beliefs that are part of the logic of the implication, specifically the belief that only God could forgive sins. So, (CE2) points out a need to understand the conditions or criteria involved in the concept of making an implied claim.

Given the failure of the simpler reconstructions of McDowell's reasoning, I will return to the more complex proposal for re-constructing (fixing) McDowell's reasoning concerning Jesus' claim to be able to forgive sins, and this will involve further analysis of the concept of "making an implied claim", or more specifically, the concept of "making a claim that carries the implication that such-and-such is the case":

5. Jesus made the claim that he could forgive sins, and he did so in a context of type X.
6. The claim that one can forgive sins, when made in a context of type X, carries the implication that one is God.
Therefore,
7. Jesus asserted a claim that in the particular context carried the implication that Jesus was God.
Therefore,
4b. Jesus claimed to be God.

The trick here is to define what is meant by "a context of type X" in such a way that the conceptual claim in (6) is true or plausible, while at the same time there is adequate historical evidence available to support (5), given the clarification.

In order to specify the appropriate context, we need to have a clear understanding of what is required "to make a claim that carries the implication" that such-and-such is the case. This concept turns out to be more complex than one might initially expect. A similar concept will help to illustrate the complexity involved here: "telling an inside joke".

In a paradigm case of "telling an inside joke" the joke teller and the person who gets the inside joke share some information that puts them both on the inside of the joke, while others who are listening are not aware of the information and thus fail to get or understand the joke. If the joke teller (JT) is speaking to two people, and one of the two (person A) has the inside information, while the other listener (person B) does not, then (JT) and (A) both have the key information putting them on the inside of the joke, and person (B) does not have the key information, putting (B) on the outside of the joke.

However, more is required, at least for a paradigm case of "telling an inside joke" than just that the joke teller and the person(s) on the inside both have the information that is key to getting the joke. The person telling the joke must understand or believe that some people have the key information, while others do not. Furthermore, the person telling the joke also understands that the people who have the inside information know or can infer that the joke teller has that information and knows that some people listening to the joke have that information while others don't.

If I am telling you an inside joke and you are on the inside of the joke, then it is not merely the case that I know the inside information, or that I know that you know the inside information, but it is also the case that I know that you know that I know that you know the inside information.

"Telling an inside joke" might be somewhat more complex than "making a claim that carries the implication that such-and-such is the case", but both speech acts have a greater complexity than one might initially suspect.

If I make the claim "The butler did it.", I am making a claim that "A woman that worked for the victim is the murderer." only in a context where certain conditions apply. I must believe that the butler is a woman, and I must believe that the people listening to me are aware that I have this belief, and even that is not sufficient. There needs to be a mutual or shared awareness that I have this belief about the butler: I know that they know that I know that they know that I believe that the butler was a woman.

If "Making a claim that carries the implication that such-and-such is the case" is similar to "Telling an inside joke" in requiring a context where the speaker and people who are listening have a shared or mutual awareness about some belief of the speaker, then the former concept has a complexity that approaches that of the latter.

If Jesus made the claim "I have the authority to forgive sins" and if that claim carried the implication that he was God, then Jesus knew that his listeners knew that Jesus knew that they knew that Jesus believed that Only God could forgive sins.

Obviously, we cannot observe the minds and thoughts of Jesus and his listeners in a particular situation that occurred two thousand years ago. However, we could reasonably infer that this complex shared awareness existed if Jesus had pronounced that "Only God could forgive sins" at the time and place when he was also claiming that he, Jesus, could forgive sins.

But there is no mention of Jesus making such a pronouncement, so we have no reason to believe that the circumstances involved the complex shared awareness about Jesus holding this belief. Therefore, we have no reason to believe that in claiming to be able to forgive sins, Jesus was "making a claim that carried the implication that" he was God.

The obvious reply to this objection is that it was a commonly held belief among first century Jews that "Only God could forgive sins." Thus the people listening to Jesus would presume that Jesus held this belief, unless he had specifically rejected or questioned this widely held Jewish belief.

I will respond to this reply in the next post on McDowell's Trilemma Argument.

To be continued...

McDowell's Trilemma Argument - Part 13

In post #11 on McDowell's Trilemma, I suggested a somewhat complex and less-than-obvious way to bridge the logical gap between the following two claims:

2b. Jesus claimed that he could forgive sins.

4b. Jesus claimed to be God.

Before continuing the discussion of my more complex proposal, I will finish looking at a simpler reconstruction of McDowell's thinking:

2b. Jesus claimed that he could forgive sins.
3a. Jesus believed that only God could forgive sins.
Therefore,
4b. Jesus claimed to be God.

Although one could raise doubts about the truth or probability of premises (2b) and (3a), the logic of the argument appears to be flawed. This argument is subject to a counterexample that is similar to the one I used against my more complex reconstruction of McDowell's thinking:

(CE2) Jesus made it plain to other people around him that he did not believe that only God could forgive sins.

In this case, Jesus might well believe himself to be God, but he would fail to make a public claim to be God, because the beliefs that he professed would not carry the implication that he was God.

Strictly speaking, a counterexample to the logic of an argument only shows that the argument is not a valid deductive argument. But the previous non-hybrid arguments were not taken to be deductive arguments anyway. They were viewed as providing a good reason to believe their conclusions, if the premises were true. So, the bottom-line question here is, does the hybrid argument provide a good reason to believe the conclusion, assuming the premises to be true?

A counterexample to the validity of a deductive argument can be completely imaginary, unrealistic, and far-fetched. So long as the counterexample is logically possible, the deductive argument is proven to be invalid. But when we are not dealing with a deductive argument, a counterexample needs to be stronger than this. It should be not only logically possible, but be realistic or somewhat probable.

(CE2) might not be true, but it is more than a mere logical possibility; it is at least somewhat probable (e.g. have one chance in ten of being true). So, (CE2) also works against the above argument, even though we conceive of the argument as non-deductive. (CE2) casts doubt on the claim that the combination of (2b) and (3a) provide a good reason to accept the conclusion.

Furthermore, (CE2) points to a whole category of circumstances under which the inference would fail. In short, (CE2) points to a necessary condition for the application of the concept of "claiming to be X". More specifically, since the argument here is not that Jesus is directly and explicitly claiming to be God, the relevant concept at work is "making an implied claim to be X."

The implication involves a logical inference, and in the situation described by (CE2), Jesus has publically rejected or denied a key premise required in the logical inference. Therefore, he cannot be taken as publically advocating or suggesting the relevant inference.

Let me restate this point in different words. If Jesus publically rejected the view that "Only God could forgive sins", then (unless he proclaimed the opposite view at some other time), we cannot take his claim to be able to forgive sins as a subtle way of claiming to be God.

Let's consider a less controversial example of this. Suppose I am a detective who is investigating a murder. After a careful investigation of the crime scene, and interogation of serveral suspects, I announce my conclusion: "The butler did it." Suppose that the victim had one, and only one, butler, and that contrary to my own assumption, this butler happens to be a woman. Have I therefore made the claim that "The murderer is a woman who worked for the victim." ?

I certainly did not make such a claim directly and explicitly, but it is also the case that I have not made an implied claim that the murderer is a woman. I simply have not made a claim about the murder being a woman. This is because I believe (mistakenly) that the butler is a man, and I have no intention to try to get people to think otherwise.

So, a necessary condition of making an implied claim is that one must publically accept (or at least not publically reject) the premises involved in the logic of the alleged implication. In the case of Jesus claiming the power to forgive sins, this carries the implication of Jesus' deity only if Jesus publically accepts the additional premise that "Only God could forgive sins". (CE2) thus points to a general category of possibilities or circumstances in which the claim to be able to forgive sins would fail to imply the deity of the person making the claim.

In the next installment I will return to the more complex proposal for re-constructing (fixing) McDowell's reasoning concerning Jesus' claim to be able to forgive sins, and this will involve further analysis of the concept of "making an implied claim".

McDowell's Trilemma Argument - Part 12

Since McDowell does specifically talk about Jesus claiming to be able to forgive sins, this would probably be a better initial premise:

2b. Jesus claimed that he could forgive sins.

The conclusion, in order to provide relevant support to the Trilemma, must also be about what Jesus claimed:

4b. Jesus claimed to be God.

The question is, how do we bridge the logical gap between (2b) and (4b)?

In the previous post, I suggested a somewhat complex and less-than-obvious way to bridge the logical gap. Before continuing the discussion of this proposal, let me back up a bit, and consider a simpler and more obvious reconstruction of McDowell's thinking:

2b. Jesus claimed that he could forgive sins.
3b. Jesus claimed that only God could forgive sins.
Therefore,
4b. Jesus claimed to be God.

This simple reconstruction of the argument shares important features with the previously considered argument that focused on what Jesus believed:

2a. Jesus believed that he could forgive sins.
3a. Jesus believed that only God could forgive sins.
Therefore,
4a. Jesus believed that he was God.

Both arguments are invalid as deductive arguments; the conclusions can be false even if the premises are true. But it is also the case that both arguments provide a good reason for believing their conclusions (if the premises are true).

Premise (2b) is supported by Gospel accounts of some incidents where Jesus declared that some person's sins were forgiven. One could challenge this claim by pointing to problems with the historical reliability and accuracy of the Gospels, but a more grevious problem with this argument is that there is no evidence from the Gospels for premise (3b). Jesus makes no such claim in the Gospels. So, this simple way of bridging the logical gap between (2b) and (4b) will not work.

Perhaps a hybrid of the above two arguments would work:

2b. Jesus claimed that he could forgive sins.
3a. Jesus believed that only God could forgive sins.
Therefore,
4b. Jesus claimed to be God.

I have previously objected that McDowell failed to provide relevant evidence to support premise (3a), and that it is unclear whether this premise is true.

Furthermore, this hybrid argument is subject to a counterexample that is similar to the one I used against my more complex reconstruction of McDowell's thinking:

Jesus made it plain to other people around him that he did not believe that only God could forgive sins.

In this case, Jesus might well believe himself to be God, but he would fail to make a public claim to be God, because the beliefs that he professed would not carry the implication that he was God.

This counterexample would, of course, require Jesus to be dishonest. It requires that Jesus clearly implies that he rejects a belief which he in fact accepts. So, it is open to a defender of Christianity to object that Jesus was an honest person, a person of great moral integrity, and thus that Jesus would not deceive others about his theological beliefs.

However, the assumption that Jesus was an honest person and a person of great integrity cannot be built into the logic of the Trilemma argument, because one of the three logical possibilities is that Jesus is a liar (i.e. he claimed to be God even though he did not believe himself to be God). So, Christian apologists need to argue for a premise to the effect that Jesus was an honest person and a person of great integrity, and that is basically how the "Liar" alternative is challenged and potentially eliminated.

We are talking now about how the basic factual premise (i.e. Jesus claimed to be God) of the Trilemma is established. The three alternatives (Lord, Liar, or Lunatic) are derived from the basic factual premise, and then considered, and Christian apologists aim to eliminate two of the alternatives. So, it would beg the question to assume Jesus to be honest and a person of great integrity in order to establish the basic factual premise.

In establishing what Jesus claimed or did not claim concerning his alleged divinity, one must not lean on the assumption (even a well-justified asssumption) that Jesus was an honest person and a person of great moral integrity. That assumption needs to be argued for later in the argument, after the basic factual assumption has been established.

Strictly speaking, a counterexample to the logic of an argument only shows that the argument is not a valid deductive argument. But the previous non-hybrid arguments were not taken to be deductive arguments anyway. They were viewed as providing a good reason to believe their conclusions, if the premises were true. So, the bottom-line question here is, does the hybrid argument provide a good reason to believe the conclusion, assuming the premises to be true?